

TOP SECRET

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State Department review completed

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25X1A

CONTENTS

25X1

OK 6. POSSIBLE SPREAD OF "TWO CHINAS" CONCEPT CALLED
PEIPING'S "PRINCIPAL WORRY" [REDACTED]

25X1A

N/2 7. MOROCCAN SULTAN DISAPPOINTED WITH AIR BASE NEGOTIATIONS WITH US [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1

**ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee** [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

28 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

25X1A

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1A

6. POSSIBLE SPREAD OF "TWO CHINAS" CONCEPT
CALLED PEIPING'S "PRINCIPAL WORRY"

25X1A

[REDACTED]

Following recent conversations with Chou En-lai, former French premier Edgar Faure reports that the status of Taiwan is Peiping's major foreign problem, and that its "principal worry" is that the "two Chinas" concept as a solution to the Taiwan problem may spread. Chou reaffirmed that Peiping gives higher priority to eliminating the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan than to obtaining a seat in the United Nations or recognition by the West. Faure, who visited Communist China from 20 May to 22 June, was struck by Chinese willingness to be patient in accomplishing all these objectives.

To Faure's query as to how soon "normal relations" might be resumed, Chou replied that this would be impossible, despite the advantages it would bring, unless France first withdraws recognition of the Nationalists. In recent talks with visiting Japanese, Chou has suggested similar preconditions for Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.

According to Faure, Chou declared the Taiwan problem would not be close to solution until "the refugees in Taiwan" understand that there can be no second China. Chou said Peiping has made no direct contacts with Chinese Nationalist leaders but that such contacts "are not out of the question." This statement contrasts with Peiping's propaganda which has sought to discredit some Nationalist officials by implying that negotiations for a "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan are actually under way. [REDACTED]

25X1A

28 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 8

25X1A

25X1A

**7. MOROCCAN SULTAN DISAPPOINTED WITH AIR BASE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH US**

25X1A


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[REDACTED] The Moroccan sultan, disappointed with the lack of progress in the air base negotiations with the United States, reportedly foresees possible violence if the Moroccan people continue to believe the United States is actively supporting the French position.

The Moroccan Foreign Ministry also considers that Washington backs France's claim of title to the bases and that it is unwilling to support the Moroccan position.

25X1




Comment

Rabat hopes to obtain substantial financial aid from the United States as well as a treaty of friendship. The sultan also hopes the negotiations will encourage France to improve its relations with Morocco.

Morocco still opposes France's claim of a right to participate in the negotiations, even indirectly, because the sultan does not consider the 1950-51 base agreements between France and the United States to be legal.

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25X1A

ANNEX

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25X1A

Watch Report 360, 26 June 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the Arab states is not probable. Although tensions continue between the Arab states and Israel and among certain Arab states themselves, these are not likely to lead to serious conflict in the immediate future.

25X1A

28 June 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 11

25X1A